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APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION OF
THE DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION THEORY
Donald R. Cressey
The author is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California
at Los Angeles. The present article is based in part upon studies of prisoners in
the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana who have been convicted
of embezzlement and criminal violation of financial trust. Earlier he had spent
several months at the Illinois State Prison at Joliet, where he was engaged in research on the same subject under the direction of the late Professor Edwin H.
Sutherland. He has followed up these studies in the California Institution for Men
at 'Chino, California.-EiToR.

For some time the differential association theory has been considered
by most criminologists to be the outstanding sociological formulation of
a general theory of crime causation.- Although the positive emphasis
of the theory is that crime is a social phenomenon, produced by and
through social learning, it has been important also because of its negative implications, namely that criminality is not a biological, psychblogical or climatic phenomenon. The general proposition that criminality
is learned is now accepted by almost all criminologists, but the details
of the theory have not been specifically subjected to the test of empirical
research. To have continuing value a theory must not only provide a
general framework within which hypotheses may be formulated, as this
theory does, but it also must be stated in such a way that it can be verified or rejected by empirical findings.
A genetic explanation of criminal behavior, stated from the point of
view of the person rather than of the group, this theory emphasizes
that it is contact with delinquency or criminal behavior patterns which
is the necessary condition for criminality and that it is an excess of
contacts of this kind which causes criminality. Persons acquire patterns
of criminal behavior in the same way they acquire patterns of lawful
behavior-through learning in interaction with other persons. The
contents of the patterns presented in association with criminal behavior
differ from the contents presented in association with lawful behavior,
but the process is the same in both instances. Specifically, the "direction
of motives and drives is learned from definitions of legal codes as favorable or unfavorable," the learning including both the technique of committing the crime and "the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations and attitudes." The ratio between definitions favorable to law
violation and definitions unfavorable to law violation determines
whether or not a person becomes criminal. This is the principle of
1. For a precise statement of his theory see EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND,
CRIMINOLOGY (Philadelphia: 3. B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 6-9.
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differential association. "A person becomes delinquent because of an
excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law," but associations may vary also in frequency, duration, priority and intensity.
An adequate and complete test of this theory probably would require
the development of a precise formula, perhaps in mathematical form,
stating the relationship between favorable and unfavorable definitions
of law violation and the modalities affecting these definitions. The past
behavior of criminals then would be examined to see whether the formula applied to them, and unknown persons would be examined and their
"criminality scores" computed by means of the formula. A formula of
this kind has not been developed, and preliminary attempts have indicated that its development will be extremely difficult. We have attempted, therefore, to test only certain segments of the theory by deter
mining whether or not certain necessary elements in the criminal
violation of financial trust 2 are learned in association with criminal behavior patterns and, if so, whether the contacts with such patterns are
additive, so that they could be used in calculating the ratio of contacts
with the two kinds of behavior patterns.
Two conditions which have been found to be necessary for the criminal violation of financial trust are the possession of the appropriate
technical information and skill and the possession of a verbalization
("rationalization," in Sutherland's terminology) which enables the
trusted person to adjust his conceptions of himself as a trusted person
with his conceptions of himself as a user of the entrusted funds or
property.3 Taking this as "given," the general problem, from the
point of view of the differential association theory, is to determine
whether or not these two conditions can be present in individual cases
without the person's having had an "excess" of associations with criminal behavior patterns. The specific hypotheses tested are as follows:
(1) Criminal behavior patterns of specific persons or agencies can be
identified as the source from which the trust violator learns the techniques and information necessary for the criminal violation of financial
2. This is a sociological concept of crime, and it includes all cases in which a crime is
committed in the process of violating a position of trust which has been accepted in good
faith. Thus, almost all persons convicted for embezzlement and larceny by bailee are included and, in addition, a proportion of those convicted for forgery, confidence game, and
using the mails to defraud are included. See DONALD R. CRESsEY, CriminologicalResearch
and the Definition of Crimes, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, LVI (May, 1951), pp.
546-551.
3. This is not a full statement of the theory of criminal violation of financial trust. For
a more complete statement see Donald R. Cressey, The Criminal Violation of Financial Trust,
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, XV (December, 1950), pp. 738-743.
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trust; (2) criminal behavior patterns of specific persons or agencies
can be identified as the source from which the trust violator learns the
rationalizations necessary for that behavior. It should be pointed out
that the testing of these hypotheses does not provide a test of the complete differential association theory since the hypotheses do not deal with
problems of the quantity or quality of contacts with anti-criminal behavior patterns. Only those segments of the theory pertinent to the
learning of criminal techniques and rationalizations are involved.
In a period of two years about 65 persons confined at the Illinois
State Penitentiary at Joliet, 20 confined at the California Institution for
Men at Chino, and 40 confined at the United States Penitentiary at
Terre Haute, Indiana, were interviewed frequently and at length in
regard to their common offense of criminal trust violation. Among
other things, they were questioned in detail about the acquisition of the
techniques and rationalizations which had been used in the perpetration
of their crimes.
On the basis of evidence found in interview materials gathered from
these men, the first hypothesis, that the techniques are learned in association with identifiable criminal behavior patterns, was rejected. It
was found that the devices, skills, or techniques used by trust violators
to perpetrate the defalcation, or to hide the defalcation once it has been
perpetrated, are the same skills which are necessary to carrying on the
legitimate routine of the work in the position of trust, and that contact
with criminal behavior patterns is not necessary.4 The techniques which
are used by trust violators are either those which are known by all
persons of average intelligence or are learned by professional and business persons in the course of the training and experience necessary to
obtaining and holding a position of trust. With one exception, the persons interviewed stated that "anyone" holding the position of trust
whikh was violated could have violated it with equal ease, as far as
techniques were concerned. 5 While in some instances an unskilled layman would not have been able to violate the position of trust by using a
certain technique, neither would that person have been able to hold the
position of trust without possession of such skill. Many of the non4. The techniques and skills used in trust violation are ordinarily used to conceal the
defalcation, not to perpetrate it. Since in a technical sense the violation of trust consists of
taking the entrusted funds or property with criminal intent, the use of a technique such as
the manipulation of accounts is merely secondary. Trust violators and others, however,
usually consider that the method of concealing the defalcation is the method of violating
the trust.
5. In the one case the violator claimed that he invented the system used for defalcation.
This is highly doubtful, however, since his system was one which is used in all parts of the
United States by persons in similar capacities.
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absconding violators expressed the idea that the violation was possible
because of favorable personal relations with persons who should have
checked on their work and that, consequently, another person, whose
personal relationships were not so favorable, might not have been able
to use the same system for violation of the trust position. However,
this cannot be considered as a technique or skill, and it is not so considered by the violators interviewed. In a sense, statements of this kind
amount to a mere reiteration of the fact that one must be in a position
of trust before he can violate that trust.
As to the techniques themselves, an accountant with considerable experience in public accounting and auditing expressed the views of the
other violators when he claimed that one could not graduate from a
course in accounting without being familiar with the techniques which
are used by accountants who violate positions of trust:
I don't think you can identify the place at which a man learned to do his illegal act.
It would be the same with burglary as it is with embezzlement. How would a
burglar be able to tell you where he got the attitudes he had when he went out? He
might be able to say that he learned a few techniques here and there, but that is
about all. In my case, I would have to say that I learned all of it in school and
in my ordinary accounting experience. In school they teach you in your advanced
years how to detect embezzlements, what to check to detect them, what to do to

prevent them, and you sort of absorb it. There is no way of knowing exactly where
you learn any habit. The same thing applies to the question of learning to use it for
illegal rather than legal means. It is just like a doctor performing abortions. In
his medical training he must learn to conduct the abortion, because many abortions
are necessary for the health of the mother. Maybe he will perform a few legitimate
abortions, and then an illegitimate one. He has learned to conduct the illegitimate
one in his ordinary medical training, but he could not identify the point at which
he learned that because he would have to include all of his courses in physiology,
anatomy, and everything else, as well as the specific technique. In my case I did
not use any techniques which any ordinary accountant in my position could not
have used; they are known by all accountants, just like the abortion technique is
known by all doctors.
The situation in trust violation, then, is not unlike the learning of
certain of the techniques essential to some other types of crime. One
who hunts or shoots a gun has the necessary technical skill for murder;
an automobile mechanic ordinarily has the technical skill necessary for
theft of a locked automobile; almost everyone has the technical skill
necessary for simple theft. In all of these instances, and in trust violation as well, known techniques which have been learned for legitimate
purposes, and in contact with law-abiding persons and behavior patterns
conducive to obeying the law, could be used for illegal rather than legal
purposes. Before trust violation occurs it is not necessary for the trusted
persons to learn new techniques for committing the crime; instead, it
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might be said that known techniques undergo a process of "circumstantiation" so that they are used for crime.
The second hypothesis was formulated after it had first been determined that trust violation occurs only when the trusted person applies
to his own conduct a key verbalization which adjusts for him contradictory ideas and values regarding criminality on the one hand and integrity, honesty and morality on the other hand. Since a rationalization
that one is "borrowing" rather than "stealing" or "embezzling" the
entrusted funds, for example, must be learned, it is inconceivable that
it could be present unless the individual using it had been in contact with
persons who presented it to him or had been in contact with some other
cultural source which gave him a general acquaintance with it. Our
second hypothesis is that such contacts are contacts with the "criminal
behavior patterns ' 6 of specific persons or agencies.
Unlike the cultural conditions which exist in respect to the presentation of the techniques and general information to the individual
necessary to the criminal violation of financial trust, which may be
characterized as conditions which inform the individual that positions
of trust can be violated, the cultural conditions which exist in regard to
the presentation of definitions of situations in which positions of trust
may be violated are conflicting. As we just indicated, a technique necessary to trust violation might be learned from an individual who presents
it as a technique for preventing or detecting trust violation. But it is
not possible for a verbalization which justifies trust violation to be presented in this way since, by definition, such verbalizations must be and
are contradictory to the ideas inherent in the words "trust," "trustworthiness," "honesty," and so forth. It is impossible for one person to
present to another an idea that there are conditions under which positions of trust may be violated criminally without presenting to him a
criminal behavior pattern.
For this reason, the general implication of our second hypothesis,
and of the differential association theory as it applies to the rationalizations of trust violators, is necessarily correct. That is, the rationalizations which are applied to the person's own conduct in the criminal
violation of financial trust are learned in association with criminal behavior patterns. It is not possible for trust violators to use rationalizations in the manner indicated without first having come into contact
with definitions of situations which to a greater or less degree sanction
6. For the specific problem here, a criminal behavior pattern may be considered as a
definition of a situation in which the criminal violation of financial trust is appropriate.
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the criminal violation of financial trust. 7 The important theoretical
questions remaining are those concerned with the quantity and quality
of such contacts and, therefore, with the specific source of the definitions
of situations which are applied to the violator's own conduct as rationalizations. If the source of a verbalization can be identified, then that
half of the ratio which pertains to the learning of criminal behavior
patterns can be crudely calculated.
However, in the large proportion of cases, it is impossible, or at
least extremely difficult, to identify the source from which a trusted
person learns the fundamental cultural contradiction inherent in the
notion that non-violation of trust is an expected norm but that there are
conditions under which trust may be violated. Our subjects were asked
in at least four different ways to identify this source, 8 but it could not
be specifically identified by either the subject or the investigator in at
least 80 percent of the cases. Rather than naming a specific source, the
subjects referred directly or indirectly to rather general cultural ideologies9 with which they had informal contact at some vague period in
their lives. For this reason, that portion of the second hypothesis which
7. However, the fact that the violator must verbalize in such a way that criminal behavior seems somehow justified, is itself evidence of contact with different sets of values
and of the fact that he has not completely assimilated criminal values while eliminating
anti-criminal values.
8. At different times in the various interviews they were asked their opinions as to (1)
where they got the idea to "borrow" or, generally, to do what they did, (2) how they happened to hit on the idea which eventually resulted in their incarceration, (3) why they had
not violated the position of trust at an earlier time, (4) whether they had observed criminal
or unethical practices, or discussion of such practices, on the part of their trustors or other
associates. Other questions soliciting opinions in regard to the source of the verbalizations
also were asked in some cases, and in addition all voluntary remarks pertinent to these
questions were recorded.
9. "When rationalizations are extensively developed and systematized as group doctrines
and beliefs, they are known as ideologies. As such, they acquire unusual prestige and
authority. The person who uses them has the sense of conforming to group expectations,
of doing the 'right thing.' . . . Unscrupulous and sometimes criminal behavior in business
and industry is justified in terms of an argument which begins and ends with the assertion
that 'business is business.' . . . The principal advantage of group rationalizations or
ideologies, from the individual's standpoint, is that they give him a sense of support and
sanction. They help him to view himself and his activities in a favorable light and to maintain his self-esteem and self respect." A. R. LINDESMITH and A. L. STRAUSS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949), pp. 309-310.
An anthropologist has given us an example of the process by which such ideologies produce non-conformity to the expected norms: "With reference to its code, any fair sized
community is bound to have its martinets and its outlaws. The average member neither
flouts tradition at all costs or follows its guidance through thick and thin: he compromises,
rendering obeisance to fine principles in the abstract and finding excellent excuses for doing
as he pleases in concrete circumstances. The Burmese are Buddhist, hence must not take the
life of animals. Fishermen are threatened with dire punishment for their murderous occupation, but they find a loophole by not literally killing the fish. 'These are merely put on
the bank to dry, after their long soaking in the river, and if they are foolish and ill-judged
enough to die while undergoing the process it is their own fault.' . . . When so convenient
a theory had once been expounded, it naturally became an apology of the whole guild of
fishermen."

ROBERT H.

LOWIE, AN

INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY,

Edition, (New York: Rinehart, 1940), p. 379.
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pertains to the identification of the specific sources of the rationalizations was rejected, and a calculation of the differential association ratio
could not be attempted.
There are numerous reasons for the trust violators' inability to designate the specific persons or agencies from which they learned that there
are conditions under which positions of trust may be violated. In the
first place, trust violators, even while in prison, seldom identify with an
ideal-type criminal, and their responses to questions pertaining to criminality often are made with consideration for the fact that they have had
little or no contact with ideal-type criminals prior to the defalcation.
Most of the violators interviewed did not consider the questions to ask
about their having had contact with, for example, persons who presented business or professional ideologies which contain definitions in
which trust violation is an appropriate mode of response. When they
were specifically questioned about this in later interviews, the responses
indicated that in most cases this idea was incomprehensible to them. An
individual's failure to identify with an ideal-type criminal resulted in a
conception of himself as something other than a criminal or an idealtype violator, and questions pertaining to the sources of rationalizations
were interpreted to be questions about non-criminal activities.
For example, persons who "borrowed" (criminal behavior) over a
period of time but who did not, in their own estimation, ever "exceed
the limits" of their own resources did not consider themselves as criminals in any sense of the term and hence did not consider the conditions
under which they had learned to "borrow" as being at all important in
criminal activities. Similarly, among independent businessmen who converted "deposits" the belief that their criminal behavior was closely
related to ordinary non-criminal business practice made the situation
such that the violators did not consider the circumstances in which these
practices (and the rationalizations for them) were learned as having
provided them with definitions of situations in which trust violation is
sanctioned. Instead, they considered the definitions to have been presented in much the same way that the techniques necessary to violation
are presented. In a strict sense, such business activities as using entrusted funds which are "covered" by one's own securities might be
criminal also, but the violators considered them to be so extensive that
they felt that the situations in which they are learned have nothing to
do with criminality. Such practices, or even criminal practices in a more
obvious sense, are sometimes presented to persons just beginning employment or enterprise in a business, and the individual's success or con-
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tinued employment in such business is dependent upon his acceptance of
them. The individual either accepts the definitions which sanction criminal behavior or he is eliminated from the business by competition from
men who have accepted them.10
Second, the entrance of a particular person into the aggregate of
persons who have violated positions of financial trust is unobstructed
by the desires of such other persons. A trusted person does not need
the permission of others in order to become a trust violator, and the
process which results in trust violation does not require direct, personal
contact and communication among trust violators comparable, for
example, to the communication among professional thieves. Trust violators have no tutelage systems, no special requirements for admission
to practice, and no special argot. What is prevalent among the associates of trusted persons is not an argot referring to illegal or quasilegal practices, but definitions, in ordinary langauge, which sanction
criminality and which, when personalized, become rationalizations.
Identification of specific persons as the ones who presented the verbalizations is therefore difficult.
Third, contacts with definitions of situations in which trust violation
is sanctioned are not in fact necessarily made within a particular business organization or with a specific person or agency, but in most instances are obtained as a consequence of the person's more general
contacts with ideologies conducive to criminal behavior. Neither trust
violators nor persons who are not even criminals can ordinarily identify
the specific source of a philosophy which includes adherance to such
ideologies. The "Jean Valjean philosophy," for instance, is one which
sanctions criminal behavior, yet most people who adhere to it, or say
that they adhere to it, probably cannot identify its source. Similarly, the
source of the idea that it is not criminal, or at least not "completely
criminal," to cheaft a large, impersonal corporation usually cannot be
identified. Specifically in trust violation we find the same situation.
Even before they accept positions of trust, persons learn fundamental
cultural contradictions in regard to criminal and non-criminal behavior
in such positions, but they usually do not know the specific source of the
patterns which have been learned and often do not even recognize that
there is a contradiction in the cultural ideologies which govern their
behavior. In many instances the presentation of a definition conducive
to violation of trust is made in such a way that at the time no stigma is
10. Sutherland relates several such cases. EDWIN H.
(New York: The Dryden Press, 1949), pp. 235-239.

SUTHERLAND,

WHITE

COLLAR CRIME,
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attached either to taking over the definition or rejecting it, and the individual is not specifically aware of the fact that the ideology entails a
question of criminality or non-criminality. Individuals develop general
conceptions of what is "proper" in certain situations for persons of their
status, and when these situations appear they behave in terms of those
conceptions.
Regarding the second hypothesis, then, we have shown that contact
with criminal behavior patterns is necessary to trust violation inasmuch
as conscious, learned rationalizations are necessary to the crime, but we
have found that the specific source of those rationalizations cannot be
identified precisely. Demonstration of the fact that there are contradictory definitions in regard to trust violation is much less difficult than
demonstration of the exact source, let alone the quantity and quality,
of contacts with each of the types of definitions. The general emphasis
of the differential association theory, that the motives or rationalizations necessary to trust violation have been learned and that the absence
of such learning will prohibit trust violation, is correct. However, the
associations of trusted persons apparently do not vary in such a way that
it may be said that just prior to the crime there was a presentation of
an excess of definitions favorable to the criminal violation of financial
trust. If there is such a variation in associations it cannot be measured,
since the source of the significant behavior patterns cannot be specifically
identified. 1 It is highly probable that the associations with the patterns
ordinarily have taken place some time prior to the crime and have involved assimilation of definitions of situations in which trust violation
is sanctioned. Hence, when the individual later perceives that the situation in his case is included in the general category of situations in which
trust violation is sanctioned, he violates the trust.
CONCLUSIONS

While the general contention of the differential association theory,
that criminality is learned, cannot be disputed, the more specific idea
that criminality and non-criminality depend upon a ratio of contacts
with criminal and anti-criminal behavior patterns is open to question in
cases of crimes involving violation of financial trust. In the first place,
contacts with criminal behavior patterns are not necessary to the learn11. While no attempt to identify the sources of anti-criminal behavior patterns was made
in this study, it is obvious that such identification would be even more difficult than the
identification of criminal behavior patterns. In explaining non-violation in terms of a ratio
of contacts with criminal and anti-criminal behavior patterns one encounters difficulties very
similar to those discussed.
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ing of the technique or skill used in trust violation. Second, while the
present research has not indicated definitely that such contacts cannot be
precisely identified and weighted, it does appear that there is no practical way that known violators' prior contacts with the rationalizations
necessary to trust violation can be observed so that one could develop
a formula to be used in either the determination or prediction of trust
violation in other cases. Only if we could observe almost every association of a person during his entire life could we say definitely that he
hadbeen exposed to an excess of criminal behavior patterns and this, in
turn, could be done only if the distinction between criminal and anticriminal behavior patterns were carefully drawn. Since such observations cannot be made, even by parents, it is doubtful that it can be shown
empirically that the differential association theory applies or does not
apply to crimes of financial trust violation or even to other kinds of
criminal behavior.
Third, the general implication of the present findings is that the
differential association theory should be modified in such a way that it
is subject to empirical test. One possible modification would be simply
to delete those portions of the theory which refer to the ratio between
contacts with criminal and anti-criminal behavior patterns. The important theoretical position that criminal behavior is necessarily learned
behavior would remain, and this position could be verified empirically.
Another possible modification would entail the substitution of a different
conception of the process by which criminality is learned for the conception of a differential in the quantity and quality of contacts with the two
varieties of behavior patterns. For example, the present research findings might be generalized to indicate that the verbalizations used by all
criminals play an exceedingly important role in the determination of
their criminality, and a search for the differences in the typical vocabularies used by criminals and non-criminals in specific situations 12 might
reveal that it is the presence or absence of a specific, learned, verbal
label in a specific situation which determines the criminality or noncriminality of a particular person.

12. Cf. C. WRIGHT MILLS, Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive, AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, V, (December, 1940), pp. 904-913.

